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1
Introduction
The year may not be 1984, but concerns of Big Brother-style surveillance have not
ceased. One such concern stems from a topic that has received a great deal of recent
attention from consumers, media, government and industry officials alike. The topic is
online behavioral advertising, which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines as
“the practice of tracking an individual’s online activities in order to deliver advertising
tailored to the individual’s interests” (2007, December 20). Online behavioral
advertising has become one of, if not the, key component of marketing in the digital age,
and the topic has peaked the interests and efforts of the advertising community, while
garnering equal concern and criticism from privacy rights and advocacy groups.
In June 2010, The Wall Street Journal published the results of an investigative study
analyzing the tracking methods employed by the 50-most visited U.S. websites. The
results were documented on the paper’s website and presented as an interactive
multimedia graphic detailing the number of tracking devices for individual websites and
presenting the privacy policies outlined by the respective sites.
Based on the study, The Wall Street Journal published an ongoing series titled “What
They Know.” It covered industry, government and legal developments related to online
behavioral advertising as well as opinions and feedback on the topic. According to an
informal readers poll conducted as part of the “What They Know” series, nearly 60% of
respondents indicated that they were “Very alarmed” by advertisers and companies
tracking their behavior across the Web (Wall Street Journal, 2011).
With such ongoing attention given to this hot button issue, it is worth taking account
of the developments surrounding online behavioral advertising in recent years. This

2
paper will detail the technology used in online behavioral advertising and survey the
landscape of voices and opinions that have grown up around its use. Court cases,
government regulation and industry practices will all be examined in an effort to produce
a set of best practices to be considered for future advancements in online behavioral
advertising. Finally, the paper will offer suggestions for further advancing self-regulation
among the advertising industry as a way of reserving government regulation as a last
resort.
What is Online Behavioral Advertising?
Most websites regularly offer content free of charge. The user does not pay a
subscription or fee, so the content is, instead, paid for by advertising. These sites are
known to advertisers as “publishers,” and make certain portions of their page space
available to display ads.
According to the Center for Democracy and Technology, publisher sites sell the space
on their pages to “marketers, ad agencies, or online ad networks that place advertisements
into the space” (2008, July 31). In addition to purchasing ad space, these intermediaries
may also make arrangements with a website to collect information about the site’s
visitors, allowing them to track the visitors’ behavior and, therefore cater the
advertisements they display. In the context of these agreements, “a consumer’s computer
connects to one or more ad networks to communicate data about the consumer’s visit and
receive advertising on the site” (2008, July 31).
The ad networks act as a sort of middleman between publishers and advertisers,
collecting information about visitors on the publisher sites on the one hand and collecting
information about advertisers on the other. Based on a visitor’s behavior, the ad
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networks pull from the advertisements available in their network and then display the
ones they believe will be most relevant to the individual in question.
The two most widely used methods ad networks employ to place advertisements are
“contextual” advertising and “behavioral” advertising. Unlike behavioral advertising,
contextual ads do not take into account the behavior or actions of an individual user or
site visitor. Instead, contextual advertising is based on the content of a website. For
example, a website about music news might display an ad for tickets to an upcoming
concert.
In contrast, behavioral advertising, as the name suggests, is based entirely on the
actions and behavior of an individual, placing ads in relation to a consumer’s interests, as
they are determined over a period of time. Ads do not have to relate to the content of the
page on which they appear. Instead, the ad network may notice that a user has made
searches relating to music before visiting a news website about current events. While no
music news exists on the current events news page, an ad for concert tickets might still
appear based on the user’s previous search behavior. The Center for Democracy and
Technology explains, “a traditional behavioral ad network assembles profiles of
individual consumers by tracking users’ activities on publisher sites within their network.
When the consumer visits a site where the ad network has purchased ad space, the ad
network collects data about that visit while serving an advertisement based on the
consumer’s profile” (2008, July 31).
The act of tracking user behavior to generate relevant ads happens in two distinct
ways. The first and most basic way is through “first-party” or “intra-site” collection.
This refers to a single website’s use of an individual’s personal information to generate
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tailored content based on previous search patterns and does not include the presence of an
outside ad network. The collection of the individual’s data most often takes place
through the use of cookies, “a small piece of text that is saved on a computer and
retrieved when the user revisits the site” (Lilke, 2009, p. 11). A unique cookie ID is
deposited the first time a user visits a site. The cookie then tracks the user’s information,
including how long the individual stays on a particular page and what items the
individual views. All the information collected about the individual is attributed to that
user’s unique ID and stored in a database. According to Lilke, “when the individual
returns to the site, the user’s browser automatically sends the individual’s cookie back to
the site. From here, the site looks up the cookie ID in its database and serves the user
product recommendations and ads based on previous behaviors” (2009, p. 11).
In contrast to first-party advertising, behavioral tracking also occurs through “thirdparty” advertising. Rather than collecting information from a single site, third-party
advertising tracks behavior across multiple sites and includes the presence of an outside,
or “third-party” ad network. In this scenario, the ad network acts as a third party by
collecting the data tracked by first-party sites within its network. The first-party sites
collect user data in the fashion described above and then sell that information to the thirdparty ad network. When this is the case, the third-party ad network can compile a
broader picture of the individual user and generate ads based on that user’s general
behavior across a number of sites, rather than the user’s specific behavior from an
individual site. For example, a first-party site may notice that a user has been looking at
information for Toyota Corollas and believe the user is interested in buying that specific
car. A third-party ad network, on the other hand, can see through its participating sites

5
that the same user also looked at Nissan Maximas on another site and Ford Tauruses on
yet another. Therefore, based on the user’s general behavior, the third-party ad network
can then tell that the user is likely in the market for a new sedan, while the first-party site
only knows the user has been looking at specific cars and may think he is in the market
for a only one brand or model.
Third-party advertising and tracking has been the cause of many consumer concerns
and complaints. While consumers can reasonably infer that an individual website has
access to their behavior while on the site, it is not as obvious that additional parties might
also have access to their information. In the following section, two legal case studies are
provided as examples of concerns raised by consumers over such third-party tracking and
advertising. These accounts will help provide real world examples of how tracking
occurs and why consumers are so deeply bothered by the thought of outside parties
accessing their personal information.
Legal Case Studies
In a November 6, 2007 press release, Facebook announced, “44 websites are using
Facebook Beacon to allow users to share information from other websites for distribution
to their friends on Facebook.” The program, designed to combine the social networking
efforts of Facebook and the 44 affiliate sites, allowed users’ actions from the outside
websites to be published to their individual Facebook profiles and news feeds. In the
same press release, Facebook noted, “Beacon is a core element of the Facebook Ads
system for connecting businesses with users and targeting advertising to the audiences
they want” (2007, November 6). Both Facebook and the businesses involved intended to
use the Beacon program to enhance their behavioral advertising efforts.
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In theory, the Beacon program sounded harmless enough. In fact, it seemed in line
with what Facebook was already doing, in that it allowed users to share personal
information with other users in their network. Where Facebook failed in launching the
new program, was in its disclosure of privacy standards and participation requests for
Beacon. From the period of November 6, 2007, when the program launched, to roughly a
month later, on December 5, 2007, default settings for the Beacon program were
designed as an “opt out” platform. In other words, unless Facebook users indicated they
did not want to participate in the Beacon program, they were automatically enrolled.
The result of these nontransparent settings was a class action lawsuit filed against
Facebook and Facebook Beacon’s 44 affiliate sites in the Northern District of California
on August, 12, 2008. According to the complaint:
Facebook and the Facebook Beacon Activated Affiliates acted both independently
and jointly in that they knowingly authorized, directed, ratified, approved,
acquiesced, or participated by accessing and disclosing the personal information
(“PI”) and/or personal identifying information (“PPI”) derived from the activity of
the Facebook member which had accessed the website of Facebook Beacon
Activated Affiliate, without authority or consent of the Facebook member (Lane
v. Facebook, Inc., 2008).
In short, Facebook and the affiliated sites published private information about Facebook
users without the knowledge or consent of those users. In a particularly telling example,
Facebook user Sean Lane purchased a ring from Overstock.com as a present to his wife.
As soon as the transaction was completed, its details (including the 51 percent discount
Lane received) were published to the user’s Facebook wall and news feed. As a result,
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Lane’s friends, co-workers, acquaintances and wife saw that he had purchased the ring
(Mullin, 2010, April 14).
The class action suit concluded that in order to change the default privacy settings of
their accounts at the time of Beacon’s launch, users like Lane would have to, “read
interpret and select nine separate tabs displaying privacy options.” Put another way, “the
Facebook user would be obligated to read approximately 4 pages and 2,283 words in
order to permit access only to their selected friends” (Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 2008). In
the current example, Lane would not only have had to find the time to sneak away long
enough to select and purchase a gift for his wife, but also to find the additional time to
read a privacy statement the length of an instruction manual and then change his privacy
settings accordingly, all in order to keep the gift a secret.
The class action complaint filed against Facebook Beacon cited more than just the
program’s “opt out” setting as a problem. One such problem was that information about
individuals using Facebook Beacon’s affiliated sites was transmitted to Facebook,
regardless of whether or not those individuals were Facebook members. Unlike
Facebook users who had the option of reading through privacy settings, “non-Facebook
persons who utilized the Facebook Beacon Activated Affiliate websites were not told that
their transaction, and indeed, every transaction they engaged in on the website was being
communicated to a third party (Facebook) with whom they had no relationship
whatsoever” (Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 2008).
Even in the case of Facebook users, individuals were not notified of their information
being transmitted to a third party until after the information had been sent. According to
the complaint, attempts to gain users’ consent were, “inadequate, uninformed,

8
misleading, untimely, and deceptive” (Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 2008). The inadequacy of
the attempts to gain consent stemmed from the fact that, when the attempts were present
at all, they occurred in the form of pop-up windows, appearing for roughly 10 seconds or
less. The attempts were uninformed in that they did not explain or specify the details of
“how, which, or through what means” the user’s information was being transmitted from
the affiliate site to Facebook. Attempts were misleading because their nature implied that
users had some control over the exchange of information when, in reality, such control
was not an option. The untimely nature of the attempts was due to the fact that
information had already been transmitted by the time users were made aware of what was
happening. Finally the attempts to gain user consent were deceptive because, in most
instances, the sharing of user information between Facebook and the affiliated sites was
contrary to the privacy policies of Facebook and the affiliate sites alike.
Nearly a month after Beacon’s release, a statement was issued by Facebook founder
Mark Zuckerberg admitting that company had erred in its release of the program.
Speaking on behalf of Facebook, Zuckerberg explained, “we’ve made a lot of mistakes
building this feature, but we’ve made even more with how we’ve handled them. We
simply did a bad job with this release and I apologize for it” (2007, December 5).
Zuckerberg went on to further explain Facebook’s original intentions behind the Beacon
program, including the fact that the goal was to provide people with a way to easily share
information across sites with friends. In his explanation, Zuckerberg noted that the
problem with Facebook’s efforts was their lack of transparency, which resulted from their
desire to make the platform as lightweight as possible. The lightweight nature of the
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platform was supposed to avoid making the act of sharing information too cumbersome,
but instead, it simply made the sharing that took place deceptive.
On September 17, 2009, the class action suit against Facebook and the Beacon
affiliates came to an end when the plaintiffs filed a settlement agreement. The agreement
called for a settlement fund of $9.5 million, from which up to $3 million was to be used
for administrative costs and attorneys’ fees. Also from the fund, the 19 representative
plaintiffs received monetary sums based on the amount of money they contributed during
the duration of the case. With what was left of the $9.5 million, Facebook was ordered to
use to establish a nonprofit Privacy Foundation “to fund projects and initiatives that
promote the cause of online privacy, safety, and security” (Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 2008).
The settlement was approved by Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California on March 17, 2010.
Just months after the lawsuit against Facebook Beacon was filed, a class action suit
was filed against the online advertising company NebuAd and at least six NebuAd
Activated ISP Affiliates (NAISPs) on November 10, 2008. At the time, NebuAd’s
business model was built on the development of behavioral advertising through
partnerships with ISPs that allowed NebuAd access to their customers’ web surfing
habits. The goal, as with Facebook Beacon and other online behavioral advertising
companies, was to provide individual web users with targeted, relevant advertising.
There was, however, a significant difference between NebuAd and Facebook’s
Beacon program. While Beacon relied on the use of cookies to track and share user
behavior, NebuAd relied on a tactic called “deep packet inspection.” In a Washington
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Post article, Rob Pegoraro provided a practical analogy to describe the difference
between the two tactics:
Tracking via cookies is the rough equivalent of a supermarket clerk noting that
you spend a lot of time in Aisle 9 checking out cereal but never duck into Aisle 2
for frozen dinners. Deep packet inspection, by contrast, is more like the clerk
following you to see which boxes of cereal you eyeballed – and doing so at every
store you visit, even those run by other companies (2008).
While Facebook and the Beacon affiliates tracked and shared the general behavior of web
users on select, participating sites, NebuAd signed on with ISPs to track every move
Internet users made while surfing the web and then provided advertising based on those
specific actions.
Similar to the Facebook Beacon case, the complaint against NebuAd and the NAISPs
alleged:
NebuAd and the NAISPs acted both independently and jointly, in that they
knowingly authorized, directed, ratified, approved acquiesced, or participated by
accessing and disclosing sensitive information (“SI”), personal identifying
information (“PII”), personal information (“PI”), and non-personal identifying
information (“Non-PII”) derived from the intentional interception of the NAISP
subscriber’s online transmissions, without authority or consent of the NAISP
subscriber (Valentine v. NebuAd, Inc., 2008).
According to the complaint, the actions performed through the joint venture between
NebuAd and the NAISPs were not based on a normal course of business, but instead,
were intended to monetize subscribers’ data for advertisement purposes. In a normal
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course of business, ISPs have a right to inspect a subscriber’s datastream for reasons like
viruses, spam, securing the network or policing bandwidth, but using deep packet
inspection to produce advertising content does not fall within those rights.
Also similar to the actions of Facebook’s Beacon program was NebuAd’s default “opt
out” setting. If NebuAd had a contract with a user’s ISP, the user was automatically
enrolled in the NebuAd service. According to the complaint against NebuAd, there were
no cases in which users were given adequate or informed notice of the true nature of the
service. In instances where some type of notice of NebuAd’s services was given, the
notice was “insufficient, misleading, and inadequate” (Valentine v. NebuAd, Inc., 2008).
Even in cases where users were provided with an “opt out” function, their data was still
collected and the only change made was to the provision of advertisements during their
web experience. In the same way that Facebook Beacon collected information about
non-Facebook users, NebuAd still collected information about users that had chosen not
to receive the company’s advertisements.
In an act suggesting the company knew it could no longer operate in its intended form,
a document was filed in the class action suit on May 17, 2009 explaining that NebuAd
would be closing its services. According to the document, NebuAd claimed it would
“cease to exist as on ongoing concern” and that it was assigning all assets to its creditors.
In the document, NebuAd further asserted, “from a company that once employed over 60
people, NebuAd now operates with a skeleton staff, and shortly, that too will disappear.
At the time the document was filed, a news story from Ars Technica explained that the
company had intended to attempt a news business model, “but the money wasn’t there to
continue, it appears, and the company is gone” (Anderson, 2009, May 19).
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Concerns similar to those raised by the plaintiffs in the above cases are common
among consumers and a large number of privacy groups and organizations, such as the
Center for Digital Democracy, Consumer Federation of America, Electronic Frontier
Foundation and U.S. Public Interest Research Group. As a result, legislators and
government officials have been seeking solutions to ease these concerns and protect the
interest of Internet users. The following section examines some of the recent efforts
made by the U.S. government to regulate the online advertising industry and develop
useful solutions for protecting online privacy.
Government Regulation
In 2010, two separate pieces of legislation were introduced to address the online
privacy rights of American consumers. In July, U. S. Rep. Bobby L. Rush, chairman of
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, introduced a bill titled
“The Best Practices Act of 2010.” Drafted after a series of joint hearings with the
Subcommittee on Communications, Internet, and Technology, which looked into the
issue of consumer privacy, Rush’s bill sought to achieve a balance between privacy rights
and industry incentives. In a press release, Rush’s staff concluded the bill “establishes a
flexible framework of basic rights for consumers while also outlining obligations for
companies based on fair information principles” (Jenkins & Gadlin, July 19, 2010).
Following are some of the key provisions included in the proposed legislation:
•

Ensure that consumers have meaningful choices about the collection, use, and
disclosure of their personal information.
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•

Require companies that collect personal information to disclose their practices
with respect to the collection, use disclosure, merging, and retention of personal
information, and explain consumers’ options regarding those practices.

•

Require companies to provide disclosures of their practices in concise,
meaningful, timely, and easy-to-understand notices, and direct the Federal Trade
Commission to establish flexible and reasonable standards and requirements for
such notices.

•

Require companies to obtain "opt-in" consent to disclose information to a third
party. In the bill, the term, "third party" would be defined based on consumers'
reasonable expectations rather than corporate structure.

•

Waive the "opt-in" consent requirement, for companies choosing to participate in
a universal opt-out program operated by self-regulatory bodies and monitored by
FTC.

•

Require companies to have reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of the
personal information they collect. The bill would also require the companies to
provide consumers with reasonable access to, and the ability to correct or amend,
certain information.

•

Require companies to have reasonable procedures to secure information and to
retain personal information only as long as is necessary to fulfill a legitimate
business or law enforcement need (Jenkins & Gadlin, July 19, 2010).

Rush’s bill did not come to a vote during the 2010 Congressional session, but Rush
announced in October that he had gained the support of three industry leaders – eBay,
Intel and Microsoft. In a letter to the representative, the companies announced, “We
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support the bill’s overall framework, which is built upon the Fair Information Practices
regime. We appreciate that the Best Practices Act is technology neutral and gives
flexibility to the Federal Trade Commission to adapt to the changes in technology”
(Jenkins & Gadlin, October, 7, 2010). The companies also expressed their approval of
the bill’s provision to allow businesses the opportunity to enter into a robust selfregulatory choice program. Acting on the end-of-year momentum, Rush re-introduced
the legislation in February 2011 and continues to search for additional support for the
bill.
Before Rush’s Best Practices Act, Rep. Rick Boucher proposed his own legislation in
the form of a “discussion” draft on May 4, 2010. Boucher’s proposal would have
mandated the length of time consumer information could be retained online and, similar
to the Rush bill, required that websites gain consumers’ consent before sharing their data
for marketing purposes. Unlike Rush’s Best Practices Act, however, the Boucher
proposal garnered harsh criticism from consumer groups and conservatives alike.
Consumers argued the bill was not strong enough on limiting the time information could
be stored, while conservative groups argued the bill went too far. In a statement released
by the Progress and Freedom Foundation, the organization claimed:
By mandating a hodgepodge of restrictive regulatory defaults, policymakers could
unintentionally devastate the ‘free’ Internet as we know it. Because the digital
economy is fueled by advertising and data collection, a privacy industrial policy
for the Internet would diminish consumer choice in ad-supported content and
services, raise prices, quash digital innovation, and hurt online speech platforms
enjoyed by Internet users worldwide” (Kravitz, 2010).

15
Boucher’s bill, like Rush’s, never came to fruition during the 2010 Congressional
session and the complaints surrounding the bill illustrated the caution and balance such
regulation would require. Boucher went on to lose in the November 2010 election and,
consequently, his privacy efforts ended with his unsuccessful campaign.
Shortly after the 2010 elections, one of the most notable government efforts to
secure online privacy rights came on December 1, 2010 when the FTC released a staff
report recommending specific practices to insure the protection of online consumers.
In addition to addressing concerns about educating consumers and fears surrounding
practices like deep packet inspection, the report set forth the recommendation of a “Do
Not Track” mechanism that could be installed in all Internet browsers. The mechanism
was the FTC’s attempt at a blanket approach to addressing consumer protection and
was developed based on the popular Do Not Call registry that currently governs the
telemarketing industry.
According to the report, “Such a mechanism would ensure that consumers would
not have to exercise choices on a company-by-company or industry-by-industry basis,
and that such choices would be persistent” (FTC, 2010). The Do Not Track tool would
be established either by legislation or, as the report explained, by “robust, enforceable
self-regulation” by advertisers and Web companies. Once established, the mechanism
would most likely exist as a persistent cookie on users’ browsers that communicates
with websites to establish that a user does not want to be tracked or receive targeted
advertising (Kang, 2010).
While coming up with its Do Not Track recommendation, the commission noted
that it sought to balance consumer concerns for privacy and business interests
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regarding targeted advertising. The FTC explained, “in developing the proposed
framework, staff was cognizant of the need to protect consumer privacy interests
effectively, while also encouraging the development of innovative new products and
services that consumers want” (Federal Trade Commission, 2010). Such awareness of
the balancing act required by regulation efforts suggested that the FTC was more
sensitive to the needs of both consumers and advertisers than Rep. Boucher was in his
own proposal earlier that year.
If the FTC’s proposed Do Not Track mechanism is eventually adopted it would
affect more than just the interests of consumers and advertisers. Internet software
providers would be deeply impacted by the proposal, as it would be the responsibility
of companies that design Internet browsers to develop and maintain the Do Not Track
tool. Microsoft and Mozilla have each expressed support for the FTC proposal since
the staff report was released, with Microsoft going as far as developing and releasing a
version of the Do Not Track tool in its most recent version of Internet Explorer. While
Mozilla has not yet released its own version, it announced in January that it would
include a do-not-track feature in its upcoming version of the Firefox browser
(Wingfield & Angwin, 2011, March 15). At this point, Google and Apple are the only
large providers of Internet browsers that have not yet announced their support.
Finally, the most recent move by the government to endorse consumer privacy came
on March 16, 2011 when the Obama administration expressed its desire for Congress
to pass a “privacy bill of rights” that would protect Americans from intrusive data
gathering. In a written testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee, Assistant
Commerce Secretary Lawrence Strickling said, “The administration urges Congress to
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enact a ‘consumer privacy bill of rights’ to provide baseline consumer data privacy
protections” (Engleman, 2011, March 16). Strickling explained that the legislation
should give the FTC authority to enforce privacy protections and take action against
noncompliant advertisers. Such outspoken involvement from the current
administration is a change from the previous hands-off approach previous
administrations took towards the Internet and clearly demonstrates the administration’s
concern for consumers as it reassesses the federal government’s role in regulating
online tracking. Strickling’s statements will most likely produce additional support for
the re-introduction of Rep. Rush’s legislation as well as provide momentum to privacy
legislation that is currently being drafted by Sen. John Kerry.
While the government continues to develop its strategies for protecting consumers,
the advertising industry has been hard at work producing its own solutions for
regulating Internet tracking. The following section examines these solutions and
outlines the recent steps the industry has taken in developing its own self-regulatory
programs.
Industry Self-Regulation
In efforts to avoid government regulation, the advertising industry has come
together to work collectively at developing a system of self-regulation. The industry’s
efforts came to fruition in July 2009 when the American Association of Advertising
Agencies, the Association of National Advertisers, the Council of Better Business
Bureaus, the Direct Marketing Association and the Interactive Advertising Bureau
collectively released their “Self Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral
Advertising.” The industry leaders developed the principles based on tenets the FTC
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had released earlier the same year and designed them to address consumer concerns
about the use of personal information while protecting their own interest in advancing
innovations within the advertising community. The effort consisted of the following
seven self-regulatory principles:
1. The Education Principle calls for organizations to participate in efforts to
educate individuals and businesses about online behavioral advertising and the
Principles.
2. The Transparency Principle calls for clearer and easily accessible
disclosures to consumers about data collection and use practices associated
with online behavioral advertising. It would result in new, enhanced notice on
the page where data is collected through links embedded in or around
advertisements, or on the Web page itself.
3. The Consumer Control Principle provides consumers with an expanded
ability to choose whether data is collected and used for online behavioral
advertising purposes. This choice will be available through a link from the
notice provided on the Web page where data is collected. The Consumer
Control Principle requires "service providers" … to obtain the consent of
users before engaging in online behavioral advertising, and take steps to deidentify the data used for such purposes.
4. The Data Security Principle calls for organizations to provide appropriate
security for, and limited retention of data, collected and used for online
behavioral advertising purposes.
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5. The Material Changes Principle calls for obtaining consumer consent before
a Material Change is made to an entity's Online Behavioral Advertising data
collection and use policies unless that change will result in less collection or
use of data.
6. The Sensitive Data Principle recognizes that data collected from children
and used for online behavioral advertising merits heightened protection, and
requires parental consent for behavioral advertising to consumers known to be
under 13 on child-directed Web sites. This Principle also provides heightened
protections to certain health and financial data when attributable to a specific
individual.
7. The Accountability Principle calls for development of programs to further
advance these Principles, including programs to monitor and report instances
of uncorrected non-compliance with these Principles to appropriate
government agencies. The CBBB and DMA have been asked and agreed to
work cooperatively to establish accountability mechanisms under the
Principles (Digital Advertising Alliance, 2009).
In October 2010, a little more than a year after the release of the principles, the
participating organizations, along with a handful of additional industry groups,
announced the creation of a coalition offering a “Self-Regulatory Program for Online
Behavioral Advertising.” The coalition, named the Digital Advertising Alliance, opened
a registration platform through their website wwww.aboutads.info allowing any
advertiser to sign up and become a part of the self-policing program.
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The Digital Advertising Alliance program requires participants to include an icon in
the right-hand corner of ads that allows Internet users to click and receive information
about the ad and who is serving it. After clicking on the icon, users are able to follow
links enabling them to opt out of being tracked by the advertiser and third-party data
partners. The annual fee for participating in the program is $5,000 for first-party
companies and $10,000 for third parties (Lee, 2010, October 4).
In a display of commitment to the program, the Digital Advertising Alliance enlisted
the support of the Council of Better Business Bureaus (CBBB) to administer its efforts.
While the CBBB was listed as the enforcement arm of the program since the time of its
inception, the council announced in March 2011 that it would be stepping up enforcement
in order to make the efforts official. In an interview with Ad Age, Eugenie Barton, the
individual charged with heading up the enforcement efforts, explained, “for everybody
who states they are in compliance, we will be checking to see if they are in compliance
with the principles. And if they’re not, we’ll be talking to them about what steps they are
taking to be in compliance, and what they’re timeline is” (Lee, 2011, March 4).
According to Barton, if there is a dispute about a company’s compliance, the company
will be monitored to determine whether or not they are displaying proper notices and
offering functional opt-out links. If, eventually, a company fails to comply with the
principles, they will be referred to the “appropriate agency.” In most cases, according to
Barton, the agency will be the FTC.
The advertising industry’s efforts, along with the proposals of legislators and the U.S.
government, all represent an acknowledgement of the fact that something should be done
to regulate the use of online behavioral advertising. The final section of this research
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paper summarizes the some of the key takeaways of these efforts and offers a set of
suggestions for moving forward with regulatory efforts and behavioral advertising
practices in the future.
Suggestions for Future Practices
As the Facebook and NebuAd lawsuits both show, one of the main issues to consider
in relation to online behavioral advertising is transparency. Consumers are clearly
alarmed by the fact that third parties are tracking their online behavior, and hiding this
fact only heightens their sense of concern. Facebook and NebuAd both erred in
deceptively collecting information about Internet users without their consent, and their
behavior should serve as a warning sign to other advertisers as they move forward with
their own efforts in the future.
It is a well-known fact that user information is collected by first-party tracking on
individual websites. However, in situations where third-party tracking occurs, websites
and advertising companies should be upfront with users about what information is being
collected or shared. Unlike the failed Facebook Beacon program, Facebook’s newer
Connect platform has seen broad acceptance from its users. Connect, much like Beacon,
allows Facebook users to share information about what they are doing on the Web with
other users in their Facebook community. The primary difference between the two
programs has been Facebook’s willingness to disclose information to their users. While
Beacon shared information without adequate notice, Connect requests a user’s permission
before sharing information between Facebook and third-party websites. As Josh Catone
put it at the time of Connect’s release, “by introducing user controlled privacy settings
from the start and allowing any site to tap into Facebook’s user base via Connect,
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Facebook has created the version of Beacon that they should have launched last fall”
(2008, July 24). Indeed, sharing information across platforms is not what concerns
Internet users. It is when their information is shared without knowledge or consent that
users become alarmed.
In order to ease the alarm of consumers while simultaneously protecting the interests
of the advertising industry, a set of regulatory practices is desirable. Such regulation,
however, poses a central question to the concerns surrounding online behavioral
advertising. Should government or industry control the regulatory efforts? The question,
unfortunately, does not have any easy answers. At this point, the government has not
formally passed any proper regulatory program and the self-regulating program created
by the advertising industry is still in its infancy. As such, neither effort can be adequately
evaluated or accurately compared to the other and the argument for one option is
potentially as viable as the next.
With that said, it is still necessary to develop a strategy for regulating behavioral
advertising in order to protect the interests of all concerned parties. Having researched
both sides of the debate and weighing the options of each, this author believes that the
industry should be given a chance at self-regulation before the government intervenes.
As evidenced by the Facebook Connect example, the industry is clearly capable of
reworking its structure to adequately address the concerns of consumers while further
developing the technology behind behavioral advertising. Through self-regulation, the
industry could continue to advance its technology without fear of punishment or
retribution, while simultaneously considering consumer concerns and government
suggestions to maintain transparency and accountability.
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A primary industry concern regarding possible regulation is the fact that the FTC’s
suggestions along with the efforts of legislators and the administration generally favor an
opt-in approach to behavioral advertising. This strategy, of course, would thoroughly
protect consumers, but it would do so at the risk of stifling innovation among the
advertising industry. If all behavioral advertising is transitioned to an opt-in strategy,
there is a very real possibility that the general consumer population could simply choose
not to participate. Such an act would be detrimental to the previous work of the
advertising community, and it is therefore worth affording the industry the chance to alter
its strategy in order to preserve the value of its work while observing the rights of
consumers and considering the concerns of the government.
Indeed, the Digital Advertising Alliance’s “Self Regulatory Principles for Online
Behavioral Advertising” show that the industry has taken government concerns into
consideration by basing the principles on tenets outlined by the FTC. Tellingly, the
principles, published more than a year before the FTC’s official suggestion of a Do Not
Track Tool, seemed to foreshadow such a mechanism, promoting some of the exact
issues the tool seeks to address, such as transparency, consumer control and
accountability. The similarities among efforts depict the industry’s willingness to include
the government's suggestions in the formation of their self-policing efforts and show that
it may be possible for the two bodies to work harmoniously, rather than in opposition.
The inclusion of the CBBB as an enforcement arm, and the use of the FTC as a
disciplinary body highlight the industry’s attempts to include the government in its efforts
and display the Digital Advertising Alliance’s willingness to work collectively in the
execution of its “Self-Regulatory Program for Online Behavioral Advertising.” In fact,
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the program embodies exactly what Rep. Boucher’s bill describes when he refers to “a
universal opt-out program operated by self-regulatory bodies and monitored by the FTC”
(Jenkins & Gadlin, July 19, 2010). The program allows consumers to opt out of thirdparty advertisements and refers companies not in compliance with program standards to
the FTC. It is worth letting such a program prove itself, before imposing further
restraints on the industry.
The program, in its current form, represents a desirable compromise between
government and industry by combining their efforts rather than giving one party final say
over the other. A further compromise could be the incorporation of the FTC’s Do Not
Track proposal in the “Self-Regulatory Program for Online Behavioral Advertising.”
While the program now offers consumers the ability to opt out of advertisements from a
particular network, the inclusion of a Do Not Track tool would allow particularly
concerned consumers to opt out of tracking by all advertisers. This would further
enhance the transparency of the industry as well as strengthen their cooperation with the
government’s efforts. It would also highlight some of the strongest efforts of both parties
by including one the of the government’s most highly praised suggestions with the
industry’s best efforts to date.
The implementation of a Do Not Track tool in the existing Digital Advertising
Alliance program would essentially please consumers, government and the advertising
industry. Consumers, for example, would be provided with upfront, transparent
information and the option of opting out of third party tracking. The government would
see the enforcement of its best regulatory suggestion and be given the authority to
discipline companies not in compliance with regulation requirements. Finally, the
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advertising industry would maintain initial autonomy over its behavior and be able to
continue developing and applying innovative new technologies without the limiting
presence of strict rules and guidelines. If, after a trial period, the self-regulatory efforts of
the advertising industry prove ineffective, with companies routinely violating guidelines
and consumers expressing similar levels of concern, it will be time to reexamine
regulatory efforts and consider imposing a set of laws and government statutes to oversee
behavioral advertising industry. Until that time, industry and government should
continue to work cooperatively in their efforts as they attempt to guard consumers and
protect the interests of a still new industry practice.
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